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BOOK REVIEW
A Tasty Tidbit
JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL*
here to start? Where to start? The maniacal book reviewer
faced with Morty Horwitz's The Transformation of American
Law 1870-1960' is like the over-exuberant tourist in one of Amster-
dam's rijsttafel restaurants, who, having ordered the full twenty
condiment curry, has to decide which fascinating tidbit to eat first.
Should one start with the shrimp toast or with the hard-boiled egg?
The pickle or the candied ginger? The fried banana or the kumquat?
Does one start by exorcising from the book the spectre of a nine-
teenth century idealist world spirit that has Classical Legal Thought
and Progressive Legal Thought (always capitalized) running around
doing things without the aid of sentient human beings acting in any
role other than as an oracular article or treatise writer? Or would it
be more appropriate to attempt to banish the odor of late twentieth
century theoretical debate that inheres in the book's identification of
the critique of positivist social science in the Twenties and Thirties,
to the extent that there was any such thing, as "modernist?"2 Does
one choose to comment on a confusion that contrasts the giving of
"somewhat more explanatory weight" to "cultural factors" as against
the specific force of "social context"?3 Just what might be the differ-
ence? Or would it be more appropriate to highlight an unrelated con-
fusion that defines Realism (also always capitalized) in such a way
that it includes two of its primary antagonists, Roscoe Pound and
Morris Cohen, and yet allows for the effective silencing of such "hard
core" Realists as Charles Clark, Walter Wheeler Cook and Wesley
* Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. This piece, my second
attempt to explain these matters, See John Henry Schlegel, The Ten Thousand Dollar
Question, 41 STAN. L. REV. 435 (1989) (book review), is for Morty in the hope that my
criticism will make his job easier when it comes time to fill in the ten year gap in his his-
tory of American law. Alan Freeman's serious objections to the first half of this essay
forced me to think out and sometimes articulate in print the reasons for what will appear
to some to be but another example of my pigheadedness. Madeline Henley's comments
were extremely helpful.
1. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORPfATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE
CRisis OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992).
2. Id. at 6.
3.Id. at vii.
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Sturges? Or again, does one focus on the author's recognition of the
decline of nineteenth century (really nineteenth and twentieth cen-
tury) causal analysis when the substitute for that analysis is the
rendering of a plausible causal sequence-turn of the century indus-
trial reorganization spawned economic and social dislocations that
certain legal thinkers argued, more or less successfully, needed to be
remedied by changing certain common law and constitutional doc-
trines-into the passive voice- Classical Legal Thought was forced
to confront both external and internal attacks on its very founda-
tions"?' Or is it better just to stick with the rise of "thick descrip-
tion"5 when thick description turns out to be the presentation of
multiple transformations of vaguely separable doctrinal lines in a
given legal field? Choices, choices, choices.
The question of where to start criticism of Horwitz's scholarly
analysis is made all the more difficult because the book is not with-
out its excellences. Horwitz's rendering of the elements of Classical
Legal Thought is on the whole convincing. His argument for the
continuity of a brand of progressive political commentary and
commitment on the part of a group of legal academics from the
Teens through the Thirties is clearly correct, as is his attempt to see
Karl Llewellyn as a bit more marginal a figure in the story of Real-
ism than is usually the case. And his implicit, but never explicit,
causal argument about the relationship of Classical Legal Thought
to industrial reorganization is, I think, also correct. Moreover, I
should be careful in my carping. It is my emphasis on the impor-
tance of focusing on the social science research done by individual
Realists for understanding Realism that Horwitz is attempting to
undermine.6 Yet, even among the excellent parts of the book can be
found tempting targets. For example, what does one make of a book
that has for its central analytic apparatus the distinction between
Classical Legal Thought and Progressive Legal Thought, yet notes
that "almost all... efforts at mutually exclusive categorical formu-
lations have come to seem less and less satisfying"?7 Does one stop to
complain about the logical defect in the apparatus of scholarship or
just pass on? Or what of the logic of the argument that social science
research is not important as a defining characteristic of Realism be-
4. Id. at 4.
5. Id. at vii. The phrase has been lifted from the anthropologist, Clifford Geertz. See
Clifford Geertz, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3, 6 (1973).
6. See John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science:
From the Yale Experience, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 459 (1979); John Henry Schlegel, American
Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case of Underhill Moore, 29
BUFF. L. REV. 195 (1980).
7. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at viii.
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cause liberal political commitment is? Is silence the appropriate re-
sponse or does one complain that the debate over value-free and
value-laden social science that most legal academics in the Twenties
and Thirties did not know about (after all, at the time it was largely
a European debate in another language) would, in any case, have
been seen as irrelevant since it was social science knowledge that
was going to be the engine for the progressive reform that even
Horwitz argues was at the root of Realism? But choices have to be
made nonetheless. So, I shall make mine by focusing on the question
of causation. Specifically, how may an historian writing the history
of things legal-laws, lawyers and legal institutions in society-de-
ploy the ancient concept of causation? May one make causal state-
ments much as one would in, oh say, military history or is one, of ne-
cessity, reduced to rendering pictures of the state of legal conscious-
ness at a succession of specific times. That question, I think, is at
the root of many of the problems with this book. Whether I have
taken the shrimp toast or the hard boiled egg is for the reader to
say.
It is a bad habit, I know, but I must admit it anyway: when I
get a book of academic history I always read the footnotes first.
Some may think my habit a practice like quickly licking the corn
meal off the bottom of the pizza, but I rather think it like eating my
dessert before my main course. You should try it sometime-you
would be astonished what you might learn. For example, though
Horwitz asserts that he continues to believe "that the development
of law cannot be understood independently of social context,"' it is
clear from his footnotes that the book was produced in a very well-
stocked law library. Law libraries are not well known for the content
and quality of the social context to be found therein and so, not sur-
prisingly, Horwitz's footnotes center in the traditional legal materi-
als-cases, law review articles and treatises.' Indeed, but for two
footnotes,10 that library could have been at Chicago, Columbia, or
Yale." That it was produced at Harvard might thus be seen as an
accident and the book an example of something that it purports not
to be, a contextless thing. Yet, I do not think that this contextless-
8. Id. at vii.
9. This is not to say that one might not learn a reasonable amount of social context
in a law library. With care, one might learn a great deal. But to do so one would have to
read against the grain, as it were, of the materials usually gathered in that place.
10. HORwITZ, supra note 1, at 340. Notes 82-83 refer to two letters available in
manuscript only at Harvard.
11. It could not have been at many of our more provincial law schools because cita-
tion to the nineteenth century treatise literature is copious and few such libraries own
much of that material. -
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ness is an accident. It is quite clearly the result of being at the Har-
vard Law School and sharing a party wall with the eminence rouge
of Critical Legal Studies (CLS), Duncan Kennedy.
Causation is a topic that has bedeviled contemporary historians
a great deal, indeed, probably more than is appropriate. Peter
Novick has detailed the arguments admirably in his recent book.12
An unkind summary of those arguments would consist of the asser-
tion that since we no longer have faith in the mechanical under-
standing of causality that produced nineteenth and early twentieth
century history-if the world doesn't work like a machine-then we
can't say much of anything about causation at all. Things happen;
they are not changed. The shift in grammatical construction to the
passive from the active is, I think, intentional. Events, goes the ar-
gument, are both over-determined-multiple causes combine in
mysterious ways to produce a result that no one of them could bring
about-and under-determined-no one antecedent necessarily leads
to any consequent. Moreover, causation isn't important; the capacity
of humans to effect events is wildly overblown. 13 Like all of the rest
of modernism it needs to be discarded as a perhaps noble, but basi-
cally misguided, dream.
Horwitz got hit with all of these arguments about causation
after he published his first book 4 in which he implied that the con-
tent of ante-bellum legal doctrine was decisively shaped by a desire
to promote economic expansion in the new country. In effect, law
was put at the service of commerce. The difficulties with Horwitz's
argument were numerous, 5 but the one that I wish to focus on is the
fact that he offered no mechanism for the apparently causal link. He
simply argued, in the style that law professors so easily become used
to, that, since the policies that could be inferred from the relevant
changes in the legal rules16 served the commercial elite, the purpose
of those changes was to serve that elite. His was a peculiar argu-
ment, not so much because it was wrongheaded, but because, in the
course of making it, Horwitz seemed never to settle on a mechanism
12. PETER NOvICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJEcTIvrry QuEsTION" AND THE
AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION (1988).
13. 1 wish to avoid taking any explicit position on the much disputed, deeply convo-
luted question of the extent of "human agency" in history, beyond what I offer later in the
text. It is a problem that, it seems to me, can be traced to both the rise of overarching
"social theory" in the nineteenth century (though of course it is a Christological problem
earlier) and the breakdown of nineteenth century notions of causation. I will let anyone
who wishes wallow in it if only they allow me not to participate.
14. MORTON J. HORVWTZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977).
15. Wythe Holt, Morton J. Horwitz and the Transformation of American Legal His-
tory, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 663 (1982) is a clear discussion of Horwitz and his critics.
16. Or the policies that occasionally were explicitly stated by judges at the time of
those changes.
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of causation. "How did the lawyers know exactly what commerce
needed to thrive?" seemed to be a sensible question to ask. Yet, it
was a question that Horwitz seemingly refused to answer.
My colleague, Fred Konefsky, explored this peculiar defect in
Horwitz's argument some years ago in the Stanford Law Review.
17
He showed, satisfactorily, I think, that Horwitz could have made a
stronger argument had he paid attention to the web of social rela-
tions that bound at least one city's legal and commercial communi-
ties together. And Konefsky's example was not an unimportant city
either; it was Boston. The point was simple. Humans in their social
relations of class and caste made the connections possible between
the legal and commercial elites. The lawyers knew what the mer-
chants needed because they not only had merchants as clients, a
rather dumbly obvious answer, but because they shared the same
social space as the merchants. Thus, it was not that The Law, some
abstract entity, served the needs of mercantile capitalism, but that
the humans living side by side came to understand the world in
similar ways because they lived side by side and so forged a law that
reflected that common understanding. Law was forged not on the
playing fields of Eton, or more aptly in Harvard Yard, but in the
numerous drawing rooms, club rooms and meeting rooms of Boston
and Cambridge. People who lived together came to see the world
similarly and, of course, the reverse as well; people who saw the
world similarly came to live together, came to join each other's clubs
and came to eat in each other's homes.
Now, Konefsky's argument was not the only one that might
have been made in aid of Horwitz's book. It is an approach, but only
an approach, to answering the more general question of how ideas or
broader cultural understandings arise in a community and are
transmitted between and among its members. Obviously, social re-
lations are situated in a vast matrix that includes newspapers and
journals of opinion, oracles of authority or reason such as parents,
teachers and preachers, and even the knowledge gained from work-
ing in, or just walking and looking at, the mills, marts and shops of a
place and time. All of these things may be as important for forming
and transmitting ideas or cultural understandings as more focused
social groupings of relative peers. Yet, I think, for reasons that I
hope to make clear, that it is a good and sensible rule, an heuristic
device, that one start inquiry into a question of causation as did
Konefsky, with individuals in their web of social relations.
I assume that Horwitz knew of Konefsky's argument at the
time that he began his more recent book. Yet it is clear that Horwitz
17. Alfred S. Konefsky, Law and Culture in Antebellum Boston, 40 STAN. L. REV.
1119 (1988).
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chose to ignore the suggestion that Konefsky implicitly made about
how to go about the task of detailing the changes in law seen as a
body of thought. The reader learns nothing about the social relations
of the individuals whose intellectual product is described. Indeed,
there are no people in this book except those acting out the disem-
bodied role of article, treatise, or occasionally, judicial opinion
writer. So, if the first book was law as judicial and occasionally legis-
lative product-the work of the judicial elite, this second book is law
as explanation-the work of the academic and the more literate, or
at least literary, lawyer elite. This shift is not perverse. The profes-
sionalization of the legal academic and the great growth of the trea-
tise literature are important events in law in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century. Yet this shift in focus leaves the reader
with the same question that the earlier book raised. "How did the
changes in the law that Horwitz describes take place? In particular,
what caused these changes?" Before exploring this question it is
sensible to review Horwitz's argument.
Stated simply Horwitz wishes to explain how Classical Legal
Thought, the name Duncan Kennedy sensibly gave to the legal
world on either side of the turn of the century," was attacked and
supplanted by what Horwitz calls "Progressive Legal Thought." Pro-
gressive Legal Thought is the legal thought of the Twenties and
Thirties that we are left to infer reappeared after the unfortunate
interposition of Legal Process Thought only to be again supplanted,
this time by our current Conservative Legal Thought. My string of
abstractions is meant seriously. What Horwitz is attempting to do is
to explain changes in law seen from a great height and in a compre-
hensive panorama, at the level of systems of thought, interconnected
beliefs that hang together to make a blanket of thought, if a some-
times tattered one.
As Horwitz sees it, Classical Legal Thought was an attempt to
demonstrate that the law is neutral and apolitical and so it is thus
natural, not the artificial product of interest, in the nineteenth cen-
tury sense. Classical Legal Thought did this by first dividing all law
into the public and the private, the areas of governmental force and
of individual will. Exercise of the former was limited by principles
that forbid the redistribution of wealth while sanctioning efforts of
police. Exercise of the latter was supported by efforts to make the
will knowable and safeguarded by rules forbidding governmental,
and particularly judicial interference, with its manifestation, except
in narrowly defined circumstances. Seen thus, Classical Legal
Thought was a structure of category-based oppositions-
18. Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness:
The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 RES. LAW & SOC. 3 (1980).
1050 [Vol. 41
tortlcontract, direct/indirect, taxation/taking-arranged in an hier-
archical fashion with public/private at its apex, policed by a judici-
ary committed to the notion that by dint of logic alone one can work
up and down the category structure to place fact situations into their
proper category and so to solve legal problems without consideration
of individual or social advantage, without, as it were, transgressing
the greatest categorical division of them all-law/politics.
How this way of thinking about the world came to be demol-
ished is the substance of most of the exposition in the book. Here
Horwitz sees, as best as I can tell, three forces at work. The first is
the criticism of aspects of the doctrinal whole by those who shared
its conservative politics. The second is the criticism of aspects of that
whole by those Progressive Legal Theorists who were opposed to the
politics of the edifice's defenders and who are the heroes of the piece.
And the third is the changes in the American economy that were
caused by, and the result of, the growth of the large integrated
manufacturing corporation and that were accompanied by a rapid
growth in our immigrant population and in our proportion of urban
dwellers. However, Horwitz never manages to explain how these
three things interrelate. This is not because he does not understand
the need to do so. In his preface, after adverting to the death of cau-
sation and with it of objectivity, he notes, "As a result, the book
constantly wavers between, on the one hand, conventional efforts at
historical explanation that continue to derive from nineteenth-cen-
tury models of objectivity, and, on the other hand, the recognition
that modernism has challenged the objectivity of these forms in
many different ways. 9 Why might Horwitz so knowingly "waver" in
this way?
Here I wish to make a great leap of (hopefully, "good") faith. My
guess is that the problem has to do with the party wall that Horwitz
shares with Duncan Kennedy, both in fact and in eponym. Horwitz's
first book took heavy hits from not only the conservative legal histo-
rians, but also from the self-styled Crits, this despite the fact that
the book was prominently associated in the academic mind with
Critical Legal Studies.0 The reason why Horwitz took hits from fel-
low Crits is that he asserted that the revisions to Nineteenth Cen-
tury legal doctrine that he cataloged were made because they aided
the growth of commerce. For the most doctrinaire of Crits, for those
for whom both political and theoretical purity were important, this
was a grievous error. Horwitz's politics may have been left (ind so,
infuriating the conservatives a "good thing") but the theory was all
wrong. Why? Because cardinal rule one of CLS was that legal rule
19. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at ix.
20. See Holt, supra note 15.
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systems (and usually legal rules) are indeterminate and so have no
necessary relationship to legal outcomes or to social conditions. Law
might have been otherwise and the capitalists would have pros-
pered; the capitalist's needs might have been otherwise and the law
might have been the same.
This assertion, best stated by Robert Gordon in his Critical Le-
gal Studies Symposium piece,21 was known in the trade as the cri-
tique of functionalism, the notion that the law serves to aid the
needs of a society or at least some of a society's classes. Horwitz's
first response to this assertion-that rule systems have a certain
"tilt" or natural political tendency22-- was received with less than
universal applause from his Crit critics. Horwitz's work in this later
book can be seen as a second response, as an attempt to go both
ways, as it were. He would and does make both classical mono-
causal arguments and modem multi-causal arguments. The result is
a predictable mishmash of things that seem to happen as a result of
the economic changes this country went through at the turn of the
century and things that seem to happen for no good reason other
than because some article or treatise writer saw some "problem" or,
as the avant word goes, lacunae in the doctrine. So sometimes, par-
ticularly in the last half of the book, the reader is in a rather tradi-
tional intellectual history and at other times the reader is in a much
more complicated, though not much more satisfactory, world that is
some cross between intellectual and old-fashioned political history of
the kind that Charles Beard made famous.'
Now it is important to see that it is the last half of the book
that is most purely Crit and the first half that is most mishmash.
After struggling for a while with the mixture of political, intellectual
and Crit historical approaches, Horwitz seems to have given up his
attempt to meet his friendly Crit critics and shifted to an honored
form, the history of ideas, the endless chatter of the mandarins and
their idea computers, a society out of Star Trek if ever there were
one.
Two examples ought to suggest the dimensions of the shift. The
earlier one derives from Horwitz's observation that in the late nine-'
21. Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984).
22. To my knowledge Horwitz never published a serious defense of "tilt," though in
Santa Clara Revisited. The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 175-
76 (1985), he adverts to the concept. For a good idea about what that defense ought to
have looked like, see Wythe Holt, Tilt, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 280 (1984).
23. The classic citation is CHARLES AUSTIN BEARD, AN EcONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913), in which Beard argued that the Consti-
tution was designed to protect property because the Framers had property and were
afraid that the propertyless would use control over state government to take it away from
them.
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teenth century, "case law moved decisively in the direction of hold-
ing an organization liable for an agent's contracts if a third party
could reasonably have believed that the agent had authority,
whether or not he actually did," while "the central effort of the trea-
tise literature was to subordinate the law of agency to the law of
contract and to emphasize that only actual authority could justify i-
ability." Horwitz then asks:
How does one account for these differences? The first thing to note is
that an objective standard-apparent authority-triumphed earlier in the
law of agency than in any other field, leading one to suppose that there is
a strong correlation between the rise of the corporation and the emergence
of objective standards. Once it is realized that the individualistic under-
pinnings of the will theory [of contracts] were difficult to apply to large or-
ganizations-indeed, that the emergence of large organizations threat-
ened to render the will theory impractical, if not virtually incoherent-it is
no surprise that courts turned to an objective "reasonableness" standard.
In general, there appears to be a strong correlation between the rise of the
corporation and the emergence of an anti-individualistic objective theory
in all fields of law.
But how does one explain the contrary thrust of the treatise literature?
Perhaps this is a clue to one of the primary functions of the classical legal
treatise, which sought not simply to report on the state of the law but to
advance a highly abstract and integrated version that was grounded in a
picture of a decentralized, individualistic economic and political order. Its
most fundamental expression can be found in the set of ideas that consti-
tuted the doctrine of freedom of contract.2
Here we have a plausible causal argument-the rise of the cor-
poration yields the firming up of the concept of apparent authority-
hedged with "suppose," "no surprise" and "appears"--that is fused to
a non-causal argument about the "function" of the treatise litera-
ture-hedged about with a "perhaps"-by means of a paragraph
break. Mishmash? Surely.
The second, contrasting example comes from a discussion of the
academic commentary on the value standard in rate regulation.
Horwitz begins, "Legal positivism combined with the de-physicali-
zation of property to produce dramatic legal changes in the area of
judicial oversight of the 'reasonableness' of governmentally regu-
lated rates."' Then, noting that the Supreme Court's adoption of the
reproduction cost standard for measuring present value resulted in
great increases in utility rates as a result of the inflation that fol-
lowed World War I, he reviews three articles, one each by Donald R.
Richberg, Gerard C. Henderson and Robert L. Hale. He concludes
24. HORWrIZ, supra, note 1, at 45.
25. Id. at 160.
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that Richberg and Henderson were "part of a movement that em-
phasized that the measure of value was not simply a factual or sci-
entific question but also one deeply embedded in controversies about
the nature and purpose of property"26 and that Hale then:
not only totally reconceptualized property as a delegation of state power to
private individuals but also pushed this conclusion still further.
'Ownership is an indirect method whereby the government coerces some to
yield an income to the owners. When the law turns around and curtails
the incomes of property owners, it is in substance curtailing the salaries of
public officials or pensioners.'
27
I suppose that one could call this a causal argument-the adherence
of the Supreme Court to a legal standard that at the time caused
utility rates to soar caused thinkers to come up with arguments that
undermined the foundations of the Court's reasoning-but the
weight of the effort is not in the direction of making such an analysis
but on the succession of articles that did the demolition work. And
succession is not even the right word, for the article that he begins
with was published after the other two. The idea then is developed
logically, but somehow is divorced from the time and place in which
it was made. This is the stuff of the history of ideas I would say.
Thus shifting to the history of ideas was easy for Horwitz to do
for two reasons. First, it is an old and accepted form and a form that
comes naturally to the law professor who day in and day out pre-
sents doctrine in a contextless vacuum, or more accurately in a vac-
uum in which it is acceptable to present the context as if it could be
discovered through policy analysis while sitting in the proverbial
arm chair. Second, because it is a succession of ideas, intellectual
history is subject to none of the Crit strictures so long as it avoids
work showing the kind of progressive unfolding of an idea that one
associates with Arthur 0. Lovejoy.28 The more random and occa-
sional the sequence of events the better it fits this Crit model. Any-
thing can happen because nothing is logically entailed, nothing nec-
essarily follows.
Retreating into the history of ideas may make it easier to share
a party wall, but on the whole it seems to me to make little sense be-
cause it misunderstands the force of the CLS position. The fabled
indeterminacy thesis is in fact a logical claim. It states that as a
matter of logic alone, of the rules of implication, doctrine can never
26. Id. at 161-62.
27. Id. at 164, quoting Robert L. Hale, Rate Making and the Revision of the Property
Concept, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 214 (1922).
28. Here the classic citation is ARTHUR 0. LOvEJOY, THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING: A
STUDY OF THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1936). More useful for the flavor of his work is
ARTHUR 0. LOVEJOY, ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1948).
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yield a determinate answer to a legal question. This is because the
meaning of words is not determinate. Words do not take their
meaning as by attaching tags on items at a garage sale; they take
their meaning from other words that they are associated with. Those
associations are not necessary or logical but arbitrary. The meaning
of a rule and so its impact, if any, as a matter of logic alone could al-
ways be otherwise.
So far so good, but, at the same time, although a legal rule
could at any time mean, and thus be, something else, at any particu-
lar time it is rather firmly set in a rather narrow range of possible
meanings. Its meaning at that particular time is thus not fixed, but
rather tethered like a horse to a post. It may wander some and in-
deed is likely to do so. So, while a rule could, as a logical matter, be
almost anything, as a psychological matter it is not likely to be much
changed in meaning over a reasonably short period of time. Thus,
one might say that at any given time the law is like a poor child in
America; when newly born that child may become anyone or any-
thing he or she wishes, but in reality that child is likely to become
one of a rather restricted range of possibilities delimited best by a
kind of class analysis.'
That the indeterminacy claim is a logical one is clear from
something Robert Gordon wrote:
[Tihere are plenty of short- and medium-run stable regularities in social
life, including regularities in the interpretation and application, in given
contexts, of legal rules. Lawyers, in fact, are constantly making predic-
tions for their clients on the basis of those regularities. The Critical claim
of indeterminacy is simply that none of these regularities are necessary
consequences of the adoption of a given regime of rules.
3 0
Here, as Gordon indicates himself, the key word is "necessary."
Predictable relationships of cause and effect are possible at any
given time because it is a particular given time. This solves the his-
torian's narrow problem of understanding meaning at a particular
time because the historian is only interested in a particular time
and at that particular time meaning is neither fixed nor unknow-
able. It is reasonably approximatible, about all that one might rea-
sonably ask of a human institution. And at one time Horwitz seems
29. An identical point can be made with respect to entire rule systems. As a logical
matter they can mean anything-as Alan Freeman used to argue in class, the United
States Constitution can be read to outlaw capitalism. But as a matter of understanding at
a particular time and place the meaning of a rule system is narrow, but not fixed. Were it
truly fixed there would be no room for change that was not a simple over-ruling of prior
precedent and such change is actually the most typical change of all in law. Freeman
makes this point eloquently in Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity:
A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 295, 316-18 (1988).
30. Gordon, supra note 21, at 125. -
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to have understood this, for he adverted to:
the obvious fact that when abstract conceptions are used in specific his-
torical contexts they have more limited meaning and more specific argu-
mentative functions. We have spent too much effort repeating the demon-
strations of the indeterminacy of concepts in a logical vacuum, but not
enough time trying to show that in particular contexts the choice of one
theory over another is not random or accidental because history and usage
have limited their deepest meanings and applications. 31
Thus a proposition that is of the greatest moment for the teaching of
law students-law could be otherwise; try to make it so!-is for his-
torians, working within the "short- and medium- run," of some in-
terest, but hardly a matter on the basis of which one should radi-
cally change the way one does history.32
To raise the question of necessity is, however, to raise the
question of causation. What does one say about how things have
happened after the death of causation? Here again the problem
seems to be rather overblown. To declare that there are no necessary
relationships between events in the Nineteenth Century sense of in-
variable, always true in any place and time, is not to deny that there
are causes to events. The ownership of the means of production may
not be the lever that Marx thought it would be, the ever increasing
expansion of bureaucratic rationality may not be as inevitable as
Weber thought and the drive to modernize, in the sense of make
functional, all of social life may not be as universal as Parsons and
others believed, still, people do cause things to happen. Only if you
want your social forces to be arrayed on the scale of the titans of
western, post-enlightenment social theory does the lack of those
forces lead to the proposition that causation is dead, or in the more
extreme deconstructionist mode, that the subject is dead. True, the
nineteenth century subject, best symbolized on the dust jacket of
Paul Johnson's "Birth of the Modern," the male Titan triumphantly
on top of the highest mountain, is dead. But people do do things and
occasionally those things have some effect in the world outside the
household in which they are done. The effects may not be the ones
intended; after all intent is easily overwhelmed by the unintended
use to which any text-written or otherwise-may be put by any
31. Horwitz, supra note 22, at 176. The great portion of the article appears in the
book under review, though not this passage.
32. For the historian of the long- or medium- run the matter is quite different. Hor-
witz is clearly not working in the short run. I believe that he is working on the short side
of the medium run, but I see that others could disagree with me, if only on the basis of
the great economic change that took place during the period about which Horwitz is
writing, and because he is chronicling a change in the legal understanding. I think that
that might be an interesting argument, but I am not going to have it with myself, though
I invite the reader to have it with me.
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reader, and most of the effects of most actions largely will be over-
whelmed by Willard Hurst's "drift and default,"" but they are effects
for which one may attribute a cause, if not a grand one.
If meaning may, while not be fixed for all time, be tethered for a
while and cause be ascribed, if not for all times and places, at least
for particular times and places, how then does one identify the cause
of either the relative fixity or of equally relative change in legal un-
derstandings? Here one might do many things. One might start with
newspapers and journals of opinion or with oracles of authority or
reason. But I think it better to begin by situating the events in
question in the web of social relations that gave meaning to either
the fixity or the change, for it was within those social relations that
meaning was more or less tethered, and so to look within that web
for the cause of the change or fixity that one is interested in explain-
ing, for it is from the shared understandings of the world that tend
to dominate social relations that the impetus for change or fixity will
be found. 4
By so emphasizing the importance of seeing and taking account
of the social relations of legal thinkers I do not wish to be seen as
advocating what a friendly critic of my ideas once trenchantly called
the "ladies afternoon tea circle" theory of human agency in history.
Understanding the social circumstances of a group of thinkers-who
they knew and talked to, what they cared about, why they wrote-is
neither necessary nor sufficient to the writing of good history.3" It is
only primary to that activity, the place where, as I said earlier, it is
good and sensible to start and thus a valuable heuristic device.
Why primary? Simply because humans, yes, even scholars, are
generally not isolates. Their work gains meaning for them in (and
33. A good word needs to be said here for "drift and default." If grand patterns to
Western or even American civilization are passe, then drift and default are likely to
overwhelm most human action. If drift and default are in fact a disguised form of "tilt,"
the collective minor actions of dozens of human, (presumably not benign) capitalist, ac-
tors, then plainly, whatever each intended, the collection of actions caused some changes
in the social system. Thus, Hurst's critics cannot have it both ways. They cannot both re-
ject causation and reject drift and default without imputing intentionality to the cosmos. I
find it amusing that they should be thus driven to Einstein's "God does not play dice", but
I doubt that most of Hurst's critics will feel comfortable with the possibility that the uni-
verse has a teleology, at least unless they truly believe that the only likely destination of
mankind is to go to hell in a handbasket.
34. N. E. H. Hull, Networks and Bricolage: A Prolegomena to a History of Twentieth
Century Academic Jurisprudence, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 307 (1991) makes a related ar-
gument.
35. And it is only the writing of history that I am talking about. Political theory or
jurisprudence may proceed in an historical vacuum as they are wont to do. Indeed, as best
as I can figure out, part of the joy of working in such fields is that of making ancient texts
sing modem songs. I, at least, will not much care so long as the practitioners do not at-
tempt to pawn their works off as an attempt-to render meaning of a time past.
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from) the web of social relations in which they find (and place)
themselves. They may understand the world in conformity with the
understandings of the world dominant within their social space or
may see (and act) in opposition to those understandings. But it is
here that life is predominantly lived and so it is here that, as a rule,
historical inquiry ought to start. 6
Why not necessary? Simply because traces of the social rela-
tions of a thinker are far more likely to be lost than that thinker's
work product. The absence of evidence of such relations does not
mean that analysis need stop, only that caution need be exercised.
Why not sufficient? Simply because ideas can come from and
stray beyond the narrow confines of any social circle. Equally impor-
tantly, it is not only individual actors that may be seen as causal
agents in history; social movements, legal or informal institutions,
struggles over ideas or the shape of a government are all potential
"causes" of historical stasis or change. Indeed, as Braudel has taught
us, even geography and climate may be seen as causal.3 8
Yet, all that said, legal and most other history is human his-
tory, especially so when one focuses on a product of human culture
such as law. It is intelligible to talk about law and the labor move-
ment in the last years of the nineteenth century. It is likewise plau-
sible to talk about Progressive Legal Thought. However, it is im-
plausible to ignore the fact that neither the nineteenth century labor
movement nor Progressive Legal Thought instantiated itself. Both
were instantiated by diverse individuals in diverse places acting for
diverse, as well as for common, reasons. Neither existed independ-
ent of the human actors who participated in the relevant activities.
The roles of these human actors may be impossible to identify or,
when identified, may even be uninteresting and so plausibly ig-
nored. But, without their action there would have been nothing to
study. And so, the primary rule, the heuristic one, is: situate the
thinker in a time, place and circle, if you can, before going on. Then,
36. At the same time, as Heisenberg has taught us all, action at a distance, the bogey
of the nineteenth century mechanical universe that brought us the ideas about causation
that still bedevil us, is not only possible, it takes place every day. Ideas do at times skip
like stones across a calm or even roiled pond and the stories of simultaneous separate in-
vention in the history of science make obvious the point that similar ideas can arise with
no more contact between their authors than participation in the same general activity,
than going to different schools together. But, in the history of science these stories are no-
table because they are exceptions. So too in law. Social relations are a more likely expla-
nation for either fixity or change than either chance or the world spirit instantiating it-
self.
37. For a good example of what can be done with limited materials see DONALD R.
HowARD, CHAUcER: HIS LIFE, HIS WORKS, HIS WORLD (1987).
38. See FERNAND BRAUDEL, THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD
IN THE AGE OF PHIP II (1954).
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that task accomplished or failed, work at the level of movements,
institutions or struggles as you wish and will.
With the source of Horwitz's problem thus made clear, or at
least clearer, the defects in the analysis that created the problem
made explicit and a possible solution to that problem outlined, it is
possible to return to Horwitz's argument in the book itself. At first
Horwitz seems to want to deny the death of causation and to assert
a proposition familiar to nineteenth century minds about the rela-
tionship between economic change and legal change. Change in one
led to change in the other. But he slowly backs off from that propo-
sition. Again, the reason for that change is anything but clear, but,
to me at least, the choice to do so seems misguided. Here again
Robert Gordon has something to offer when he counsels fellow Crit
historians that it may not be uncalled-for when readers ask that
Crits. .
embed their story in a narrative context that would at least supply sub-
jects and occasions to the narrative to show that it is human beings with
reasons and motives, not disembodied Spirits, who drive the manufacture
of legal concepts: Who pushed which arguments? What happened to
destabilize previously stable conventions? We ought to have a rule of style:
no sentence without a subject; no intellectual move without a reason-
even if the particular subject and reason may sometimes be largely inci-
dental to the grander thematic history of legal consciousness.
39
Horwitz seems to follow one of these strictures very well; almost all
sentences have subjects and when they do not it is because the sub-
ject is so insignificant that no one could possibly know whom the
subject was.40 But as for occasions, the social relations in which the
thinker may be understood, the reader is left sadly at sea.
Now it is often difficult to infer the occasion for the writing of
any article or treatise. Sometimes the historian reader is told di-
rectly, but most often that is not the case. One then must infer the
occasion, the context that gives meaning, more or less, to the text.
Here is where Horwitz fails dismally, largely, I think, because he
both pitches his reason-economic change-so high that he is deeply
vulnerable to the criticism from the other side of the party wall that
causation is dead and because he has absorbed just enough of that
criticism to allow the pure historian of ideas inside to assert itself.
After all, the truly amazing thing about Horwitz's first book was
that it married traditional intellectual history as the history of ideas
with a Beardian economic interpretation4' of all the shifts in legal
39. Gordon, supra note 21, at 118 (footnotes omitted).
40. Indeed many of the subjects are quite obscure even to the legal historian.
41. See supra note 23 for Beard's argument that directly parallels Horwitz's argu-
ment in his first book as set forth above. HORWrTZ, supra note 1, at 5.
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doctrine in the early nineteenth century. If that marriage is some-
how problematic, it is ever so easy to fall back on the history of ideas
model and reduce the humans to virtual ciphers, the authors, devoid
of agency or intent and thus suitably post-modern, of texts that
merit attention without regard to the occasion of their production or
use. It is the mistake that Gordon cautions against and part of
Horwitz's mistake in his earlier book that Konefsky attempted to re-
pair.
Could one do the same repair job on this book? I think that the
answer is "Yes" and what is more important doing so might help to
explain a modest anomaly in the book. Almost all of the key players
in the second part of Horwitz's story have never been thought to be
Realists by anyone else, and indeed have traditionally been seen as
antagonists of Realism. How could Horwitz have managed to present
them as Realists without being obviously obstinate?42
When Konefsky looked at Horwitz's first book he spent time re-
constructing the network of inter-marriages and cross-ownership
that made up Boston's commercial and legal elite in the early dec-
ades of the nineteenth century. With the growth of this country and
the dispersion of its elites at least inter-marriage became increas-
ingly difficult to document for any national group, though cross-
ownership in the form of that great populist bogey, interlocking di-
rectorates, might be the basis for the construction of some social re-
lationships. But by 1880, rail transport had become extensive
enough that clients need no longer be generally local and vacations
some distance from home became a real possibility. One of the most
popular spas, as they were called, was at Saratoga Springs, known
not just for its waters but especially for its race course. Here in late
summer fancy lawyers gathered as did bankers, manufacturers, and
transportation officials. They came together because they shared a
common understanding of the world in which they lived and they
shared and developed that common understanding because they
came together. As such they both instantiated and built a set of so-
cial relations that bears attending to. It is here where the American
Bar Association was born, not as a conspiracy, but as a gathering of
like minds of like social status on like social errands to raise the
standards of the profession in the face of the economic and social
disorder that came with the massive industrialization that followed
the Civil War.43
42. 1 ask "How" intentionally, as a matter of method. I know "Why." For my answer
to that question see infra pp. 1068-69.
43. This story has now been told several times. My favorite is still JEROLD S.
AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976).
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Curiously, well really not so curiously, most of the major fig-
ures whose work Horwitz relies on to build up his picture of Class-
ical Legal Thought were members of the ABA and active in its af-
fairs. The activities of a good number of them, including Thomas H.
Cooley, James Coolidge Carter, John F. Dillon, and Christopher G.
Tiedeman have been chronicled many times, first by Benjamin R.
Twiss," then by Clyde D. Jacobs45 and most recently by Arnold
Paul.46 Horwitz's footnotes indicate that he knows of, at least some of
this work 4 7 yet he chooses to ignore the connection between these
men, a connection that becomes stronger when one adds to the list
Theodore Dwight, Albert Keener and Victor Morawetz, other charac-
ters in his play. There are exceptions to the list; Seymour D. Thomp-
son, a prolific treatise writer from Missouri, was apparently not a
member and William W. Cook, a prominent New York lawyer, writer
of a great treatise on corporations and major benefactor of the
Michigan Law School, seems not to have been a member either. But
both are interesting exceptions because of Thompson's more than oc-
casional progressive leanings as detailed by Paul and because of
Cook's client base that possibly meant other occasions for meeting
with the people at Saratoga Springs.
I do not wish to be heard to suggest that these individuals
gathered together in Saratoga Springs, decided what law would be
good for the country and their clients and then worked to make that
law a reality. There was no equivalent of Judge Gary's dinners for
the steel industry. Rather, it was this group of men, held together by
ties of interest and association, who made Classical Legal Thought
and who, because of their adherence to the principles of Classical
Legal Thought so admirably delineated by Horwitz, found a common
interest and a pleasant association on the big white porches of great
vacation hotels and not incidentally in the club rooms of New York
City as well. Just as Konefsky's lawyers and merchants who lived
and worked together came to understand each other's way of seeing
the world and so to respond to each other's perception of the needs of
the country, Horwitz's lawyers (and their clients too, I suspect)
formed a group who thought alike because they learned from one
another and learned from one another because they found common
44. BENJAIN R. Twiss, LAwYERs AND THE CONSTITUTION: How LAISSEZ FAiRE CAME
TO THE SUPREME COURT (1942).
45. CLYDE D. JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THOMAS.
M. COOLEY, CHRISTOPHER G: TIEDMAN AND JOHN F. DILLON UPON AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW (1954).
46. ARNOLD PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATrrrUDES OF THE
BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895 (1960).
47. HORWlTz, supra note 1, at 24 n.96 (citing PAUL, supra note 46 and TWISS, supra
note 44).
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ground thinking and talking together.
And why did they find Classical Legal Thought to be a common
ground between them? Here I venture a guess and only that since I
do not wish to do all the work that would be necessary to come to
understand these men. Classical Legal Thought had both a sub-
stantive and a procedural attraction to men who were trying to help
run a country in the years around the turn of the century. Substan-
tively, they believed it kept government off their backs as they
transformed America from a nation of small entrepreneurial and
mercantile capitalists into a nation of larger corporate capitalists
with all of the attendant dislocation that comes with a major shift in
the form of economic life in any country. Procedurally they believed
that by developing a system that combined high abstraction and
classification by opposition they could, as Horwitz indicates, better
maintain that the decisions that were being made were not political
and at the same time keep political authority in judicial, and thus
relatively safe and friendly, rather than legislative, and thus rela-
tively less safe and less friendly, hands.
Was their belief true? Was this system of thought functional? If
functional, was it necessarily so? I don't know. Moderately. Of course
not. And that is the point. Classical Legal Thought didn't come from
the invisible hand of the idea computers in some Star Trek space. It
came from the action of human beings who acted as if their system
had these properties. Did it fool anyone? I don't know and I don't
care to do the work to find out. Did it facilitate their enterprise? I
think so because in its guise as constitutional principle it seems to
have retarded legislative intervention from time to time. Could an-
other system for ordering law have done as well or better? As a logi-
cal matter, quite obviously, though today I can't conjure one up. And
that is the point. The causal efficacy of the actions of this group of
humans with similar senses of what needed to be done derived out of
(and not because of) close association, and the functionality, the
time-bound not timeless usefulness, of those actions are compatible
with an absence of necessity. That is to say, causation is not just
possible, it is likely without any particular of the system bearing the
old torts teacher's "but for" relationship that is so beloved of the
nineteenth century historical mind.48
48. The matter is well put, maybe better put than I have done here, by MARTIN J.
SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-1916: THE
MARKET, THE LAW, AND POLITICS (1988) a book that shared the Hurst prize with Ted
White's Holmes' Devise volume on the Marshall Court. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE
MASHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835 (1988). Sklar writes:
[My] study does not assume that small-producer, competitive capitalism was
"natural" or the "true type" of capitalism, and that corporate capitalism was
"unnatural," an artificial construct, or a "political" usurpation, a view corre-
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What then about the destruction of Classical Legal Thought by
what came later? Here again, I think paying attention to who knows
and works with whom can yield insights about causation. Horwitz
relies for his argument on a peculiar cast of characters: Charles
Beard, A. A. Berle, Francis Bohlen, James Bonbright, Benjamin N.
Cardozo, David Cavers, Felix Cohen, Morris R. Cohen, John R.
Commons, Walter Wheeler Cook, Arthur Corbin, Edward S. Corwn,
John Dawson, John Dewey, Richard T. Ely, Ln Fuller, Robert Lee
Hale, Charles Grove Haines, Gerard C. Henderson, Wesley N. Hoh-
feld, Nathan Isaacs, Lewis Jaffe, Fleming James, James Landis,
Harold Laski, Donald Richberg, Warren Seavey and Jerimiah
Smith. All are said to be Realists." True, he does not deny that the
usual cast of characters including Thurman Arnold, Charles E.
Clark, William 0. Douglas, Walton Hamilton, Karl Llewellyn, Un-
derhill Moore, Herman Oliphant, Wesley Sturges and Hessel Yn-
tema are Realists, but he spreads the net a good bit wider than is
usual and slights this traditional group with the assertion that some
represent "the narrowest and most naively behaviorist versions of
positivist social science. 5° Everyone is entitled to their opinion
about the Realist's attempts at social science. I obviously think more
of the body of work than does Horwitz, but that is not the important
question. That question is, "What are the grounds for adding all
sponding with the populist outlook. Nor does it assume that corporate capital-
ism was the natural outcome of "objective" techno-economic evolution, a view
corresponding with the pro-corporate outlook. In holding, rather, that capital-
ism and its class relations have a history, like all else in human affairs, the
study assumes that the corporate-administered stage, which transpired during
the period 1890-1916, was a part of capitalism's historical development in the
United States. It also assumes that neither stage was more "natural" or "less"
political than the other, but that in whatever stage, historical development pro-
ceeded through human agency in such forms as social movements, political and
ideological conflict, struggles over the shape and role of law and government,
and so on, and in such ways as usually to have yielded wide disparities between
intentions and consequences.
If the Marxists get it, can the Crits be far behind?
49. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 182-85 lists many of the names. The rest are discussed
in the balance of the book at some length. Some of Horwitz's list and some of his argu-
ment derives from the material first brought to light in N. E. H. Hull, Some Realism
about the Llewellyn-Pound Exchange over Realism: The Newly Uncovered Private Corre-
spondence, 1927-1931, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 921 (1987). Hull reproduced the various lists of
Realists that Llewellyn drew up before publishing the list of twenty found in his article,
Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism, a Reply to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV.
1222 (1931). This list of twenty has focused discussion of the question, "Who were the
Realists?" for some time. Horwitz sensibly questions the list which has some serious
omissions-Thurman Arnold and Walton Hamilton-as well as peculiar inclusions-Ar-
thur Corbin, who according to Hull, objected to his inclusion, Ernest Lorenzen, Edwin
Patterson and T. R. Powell.
50. HORWITZ, supra note 1 at 181.
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these names to the movement in the first place? What, other than
Horwitz's fiat, holds the larger group together?"
At first I thought the answer was "nothing." Then it became
clear that all, or nearly all,5 ' shared a kind of reformist politics that
might qualify them for inclusion in some hypothetical "big tent" or-
ganization, some "progressive" popular front in the Twenties and
Thirties. But there is a problem with this reading, because, if that is
the criterion for admission, then two names are obviously missing:
Roscoe Pound and Felix Frankfurter.2 At least Pound's early work
needs to be included,53 though by the Thirties he was clearly on his
way to becoming a troglodyte, and Frankfurter was as deeply in-
volved in reform as any law professor on the list.
Horwitz does give Pound's early writing its due, but the struc-
ture of his narrative, focusing on the Llewellyn-Pound exchange
about Realism and on the now ancient question, 'Who are the Real-
ists?" precludes much of a central role for him among the heroes. I
suppose that Frankfurter's association with Legal Process jurispru-
dence makes it difficult to include him in the group without con-
fronting, as to him as well, the question that has so bedeviled schol-
ars attempting to deal with Pound's career, "Why did his politics
change?"5 4 Still, the inclusion of Pound and Frankfurter in the group
makes much sense and once these two are included in the list then
matters become a bit simpler.
Morris Cohen was Frankfurter's law school roommate; Felix,
his son is named for Felix, the friend. Laski was a friend of Frank-
furter's and Landis, a proteg6. Nathan Isaacs was a student of
Pound's as well as a collaborator; Hohfeld was a good friend of
Pound's. Both Pound and Frankfurter are links to major progressive
reform organizations like the National Civic Federation and the
National Municipal League through their contacts as Harvard fac-
ulty members. Commons was active in the Civic Federation; Rich-
51. It is not clear to me that Fuller, Jaffe and Seavey belong in the group even on
this understanding of its nature, but here I will give Horwitz the benefit of the doubt.
52. At least two of Llewellyn's lists included Frankfurter, more than included Berle,
Bohlen, Bonbright and Hale, and as many as included Landis whom Horwitz includes in
his list.
53. At least one of Llewellyn's correspondents who ended up on the published list,
Bingham, thought that doing so was correct.
54. The answer, in both cases, I think, is not that either man's politics changed.
Rather the times and the issues changed and as a result brought to the fore aspects of
each scholar's thought that could be ignored at an earlier time. It is the continuity in the
thought of both men that thus makes their central role in the network of scholars that
Horwitz has identified so important for understanding that group of scholars.
55. SKLAR, supra note 48, does some wonderful work on the membership of the Na-
tional Civic Federation circa 1907 that shows how one might flesh out the social world of
either Classical or Progressive Legal Thought. He notes:
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berg, on the labor side as well, was active in the Progressive party
and involved in drafting the NRA and the NIRA. Seavy and Bohlen
(briefly) were colleagues at Harvard. Henderson and Berle were both
students there in the years right alter Frankfurter joined the fac-
ulty. A modest set of social relations, though one hung together by a
rather suspect, anything but Realist, duo.
Of course, this does not cover everyone in Horwitz's list, but if
one cuts out the truly bizarre-Jerimiah Smith, a contemporary of
Langdell-and the too general to be plausible and besides, of an-
other generation-Commons, Ely and Dewey-one is left with a
more manageable number anyway and the possibility of some inter-
esting generational comparisons. Of the balance one has one gen-
erational group-Pound, Beard and Bohlen-a second group about
one-half generation younger-Frankfurter, Morris Cohen, Corwin,
Hohfeld, Seavy and Richberg-then a third group, another one-half
generation still younger-Berle, Bonbright, Henderson and Lan-
dis-and finally a still younger group-Cavers, Felix Cohen, Fuller,
Jaffee and James.56 Can one see a difference between Pound, Beard
The federation's active leaders consisted of prominent figures from a cross sec-
tion of economic, political, intellectual, religious and cultural elites: capitalists
prominent in railways, communications, industry, commerce, and investment
banking, former and current senior officers of the federal government; eminent
members of the legal profession; national officers of farmers' organizations and
trade unions; prominent publishers and journalists; high-ranking clergy;, and
university presidents and professors.n
3 In late 1907 the NCF's officers were: president: August Belmont; vice-presi-
dents: Samuel Gompers, Nahum J. Bachelder, Ellison A. Smyth, Benjamin I.
Wheeler; Treasurer: Isaac N. Seligman. Its executive council, the inner leader-
ship, separate from the larger executive committee, consisted of the officers;
Ralph M. Easley, chair of the executive council; and the chairs of the standing
committees. In 1907 these were: John Mitchell (trade agreement committee),
Charles A Moore (welfare), E. R. A. Seligman (taxation), Seth Low (conciliation),
William H. Taft (public employees' welfare), Nicholas Murray Butler (industrial
economics), Melville E. Ingalls (public ownership), and Franklin MacVeagh
(immigration). The executive committee was organized in such a way as to re-
group the various social sectors represented in it into three larger groupings
conceived as constituting the society as a whole - capital, labor, and the public
(with farmers categorized as part of the public). As of October 1907, the execu-
tive committee members included, in each of the three categories, the following
persons:
1. "On the part of the Public": government: ex-president Grover Cleveland,
ex-secretaries of the interior Cornelius N. Bliss and David R. Francis, U.S. At-
torney-General Charles J. Bonaparte; capital: Andrew Carnegie and V. Everit
Macy (each listed as "Capitalist"), Isaac N. Seligman and James Speyer (each
listed as member of his respective investment house); agriculture: Nahum J.
Bachelder (master, National Grange) and John M. Stahl (president, Farmer's
National Congress); religion: Roman Catholic Archbishop John Ireland of St.
Paul, Minn., and Episcopal Bishop Henry C. Potter of New York City;, higher
education: Benjamin Ide Wheeler (president, University of California, Ber-
1066 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41
and Bohlen and the most obvious Realist of that generation-Cook?
Maybe not with Beard, but surely with Pound and Bohlen. Cook op-
posed the Restatement project that Pound supported and Bohlen
gave his life to, and Cook constantly criticized Pound's notion that
the known and knowable techniques of the common law yielded
keley), Charles W. Eliot (president, Harvard University), Nicholas Murray
Butler (president, Columbia University); and Seth Low, "Publicist."
2. "On the Part of Employers": industry: Henry Phipps (director, U.S. Steel
and International Harvester, formerly longtime partner and close associate of
Carnegie), William A. Clark (president, United Verde Copper Co.), Clarence H.
Mackay (president, Postal Telegraph-Cable Co.), M. H. Taylor (president, Pitts-
burgh Coal Co.), Samuel Mather (president, Picklands, Mather & Co., director
of Lackawanna Steel, brother-in-law of John Hay), Charles A. Moore (president,
Manning, Maxwell & Moore), Ellison A. Smyth (president, South Carolina Cot-
ton Manufacturers' Association), Dan R. Hanna (of M. A. Hanna & Co., Cleve-
land), Marcus M. Marks (president, National Association of Clothing Manufac-
turers), Otto M. Eidlitz (chairman of Board of Governors, Building Trades Em-
ployers' Association); railroads: Lucius Tuttle (president, Boston & Maine Rail-
road), Frederick D. Underwood (president, Erie Railroad), Melville E. Ingalls
(chairman, C.C.C. & St. Louis Railway, part of the New York Central System),
H. H. Vreeland (president, New York Central Railway Co.); finance and bank-
ing- August Belmont (president, August Belmont & Co.), Franklin MacVeagh
(president, Franklin MacVeagh & Co., Chicago, became President Taft's secre-
tary of the treasury); journalism and publishing: Frank A. Munsey
("Publisher"), Charles H. Taylor, Jr. (ex-president, American Newspaper Pub-
lishers' Association).
3. "On the Part of Wage Earners": American Federation of Labor Unions:
Samuel Gompers (president, AFL), John Mitchell (president, United Mine
Workers of America), Daniel J. Keefe (president, International Longshoremen,
Marine and Transportworkers Association), William D. Mahon (president,
Amalgamated Association of Street Railway Employees of America), William J.
Bowen (president, Bricklayers' and Masons' International Union), James
O'Connell (president, International Association of Machinists), John F. Tobin
(president, Boot and Shoe Workers Union), Joseph F. Valentine (president, Iron
Moulders' Union of North America), James M. Lynch (president, International
Typographical Union), William Huber (president, United Brotherhood of Car-
penters and Joiners of America), James Duncan (general secretary, Granite
Cutters' International Association of America), Timothy Healy (president, In-
ternational Brotherhood of Stationary Firemen), Denis A. Hayes (president,
Glass Bottle Blowers' Association of United States and Canada); railway broth-
erhoods: A. B. Garretson (grand chief conductor, Order of Railway Conductors),
Warren S. Stone (grand chief, International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engi-
neers), P. H. Morrissey (grand master, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen), J. J.
Hannahan (grand master, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen). Id. at 204-06.
56. I have omitted Cardozo from the list. His two books were an inspiration to many
of the Realists. I do not know what to do with him, but nothing rises or falls on his inclu-
sion or exclusion as he was an isolate in ways that Brandeis, someone else that Horwitz
unaccountably misses, was not. Hale, Haines and Isaacs fit between the Frankfurter
group and the Berle group. It would require more work than I wish to do to decide in
which generation to place them though my guess is that Haines goes with Corwin and
Isaacs does too. Hale stands alone as befits that truly singular man.
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definite answers to legal questions. Contrast Frankfurter's genera-
tion with the most obvious Realists-Bingham and Moore.57 Here
the heavy odor of progressive reform distinguishes Frankfurter,
Corwin and Richberg from the two Realists who paid little~attention
to such causes; Seavy, again, is part of the grand Restatement pro-
ject ridiculed by one and all; Cohen defined himself as an anti-Real-
ist, thought clearly he understood, indeed made, several important
"realist" points about property; and that leaves Hohfeld whose ana-
lytic jurisprudence was precisely the kind of abstraction that the
Realists constantly complained of. In the next generation only Berle,
who wished to come to Yale to do his great book, but was rebuffed
from doing so by Hutchins, has any claim to fit with Clark, Frank,
Green, Llewellyn, Oliphant and Sturges. He seems to treat law as a
naturalistic phenomenon as do the others, more or less. Bonbright
was interested in a question of value that no Realist could possibly
take seriously; Henderson, in corporation doctrine and then there is
Landis, who like many of the Realists got seduced by Washington
and power, but who seemed never to be able to bring the outsider's
perspective that one needed to operate well in such place back to his
scholarship and who seemed less to wish to understand than to wish
to make the law in action correspond to the theory on the books .5
Where then are we? In contrast to the rather close personal and
social relations of the group that is generally seen as making up the
Realists, Horwitz puts forth a group that, I suspect, was selected
largely for the affinities with the notion that Realism is a big tent
that merely continues pre-war progressive doctrinal criticism of Cl-
assical Legal Thought than for any other reason. Each seems once,
or occasionally more than once, to have had an "idea" put forth in an
article somewhere that either is like "ideas" put forth by individuals
more prominently associated with Realism or is traceable to such
Realist ideas or even to the more ephemoral "influence" of Realism.
57. Powell and Radin of this age group are usually included among the Realists. I am
not clear whether they belong there at all, however I reserve judgment until I have read
all of their work.
58. I leave the youngsters for some other hand. Fuller's inclusion in the list is simply
silly; he made his reputation attacking Realism and spent his entire career attempting to
repair what he thought was the damage that it had done to our understanding of law.
Cavers and Dawson are so clearly of another generation as to be part of some other story,
though an interesting one that would include Willard Hurst. What should be made of
Horwitz's one remaining nominee, Felix Cohen, is a quite complicated matter that has to
do with fathers and sons as well as with the question of where an interesting book and
two famous articles fit in a life that could not escape scholarship but succeeded in escap-
ing academia. I doubt whether he belongs with either of the Realist's young kids-
Douglas or Redell. In any case children of an intellectual movement who identify with,
rather than rebel against their parents pose a truly complicated problem that I will not
tackle for the sake of completeness of analysis.
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In other words, each was chosen for his particular, isolated, disem-
bodied thoughts; each exemplifies the primacy of the reified category
of thought-Realism-in Horwitz's book that so magnifies the diffi-
culty of providing any causal account of the transformation in
American legal thought that he is attempting to explain.
In contrast, a web of social relations for some of the law profes-
sors and others can be created around the Frankfurter-Pound dyad
to such an extent that it is not wholly implausible to consider them a
group, but, if a group, then a group that is equally well seen for their
differences generation by generation from and with the suspects
usually rounded up when Realists are wanted, as for the similarities
that come from a vaguely left politics and shared doctrinal critique.
My guess is that it is a real social/intellectual group of theorists and
policy-makers and that had Horwitz directly confronted their special
social/intellectual nature he would be remembered for doing so just
as Bruce Ackerman is remembered for identifying the group of indi-
viduals now universally seen as Legal Process scholars. 9 What to
call this group is, I think, an interesting question. 60 Its work led di-
rectly into the legal process scholarship of the Forties and Fifties, a
scholarship that, it should not be forgotten, was a kind of reform
scholarship as well as a breaking away from Realism. I don't much
like the people who fall in the group, so I am not going to do the
work, but my guess is that, if someone cared enough about them to
do the work, that individual would find that what holds the group
together is a preference for internal critique and an identification
with the agenda of the "better" elements of the elite segment of the
bar. Thus, though the group would share with the Realists a com-
mitment to reform that Horwitz emphasizes (and rightly so), it
would differ from that group that seems to me more, though not ex-
clusively, committed to external critique of law and legal institu-
tions61 and more wary of, "opposed to" is clearly the wrong phrase,
the agenda of the elite bar, even its better elements.
Why did Horwitz choose to lump that Frankfurter-Pound group
together with the usual Realist suspects? No doubt there are many
reasons. One is a clear preference for seeing the primacy of capital-
ized categories of thought as the major counters for telling the story
59. Bruce A. Ackerman, Law and the Modern Mind by Jerome Frank, 103 DAEDALUS
119 (Winter 1974). Curiously G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration:
Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279 (1973), identified this
grouping of scholars first but is not known for having done so.
60. 1 am tempted to call them Corporate Liberals.
61. And also more committed to seeing law as an institution and not as a body of
rules, though here clearly Frankfurter shares some of the predilections of the Realists.
The difference is that he tended to idealize the institutional aspect of the law while Real-
ists like Arnold, Frank and Robinson tended to debunk those aspects.
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of law in the United States. Like Langdell, for whom, whatever his
pretense of science, the principles of law tested the cases for their
correctness and not the other way around, Horwitz uses ideas to test
for group membership and not the other way around-or what
would be even better, both ways around. Another reason has been
noted by reviewers who have made the point that the story that
Horwitz tells is set up so that the off stage party, Critical Legal
Studies, is ready to ride into the scene to save the fair maiden of the
law from the evil clutches of recurrent formalism.2 Related to this
matter of who is the off-stage hero of the story is a third, somewhat
independent reason for Horwitz's choice, a matter that I have ad-
verted to earlier: empirical social science. Horwitz sees empirical
social science as a drag on social criticism and reform. Therefore, he
wishes to separate Progressive Legal Thought from the baleful in-
fluence of the empirical social scientists so that his hero may march
triumphantly into the present as part of current efforts at
"progressive" legal reform."3 To exclude empirical social science from
the play, Horwitz neatly expands his categories to sweep Realism
into a big tent and so make its empiricist streak seem anomalous. It
is a move that Classical Legal Thought would understand and prob-
ably applaud, but it also is a form of ancestor fetishism-the nobility
of ones' ancestors adds legitimacy to ones' cause-better suited to
devotees of genealogical research or obscure bits of the British aris-
tocracy. Ancestor fetishism is, I suppose, harmless or more accu-
rately would be harmless but for Horwitz's standing in the world of
legal history. But given that standing, so glaring an example of al-
lowing present concerns to color our approach to the past, a bit of
Lawyer's History of the kind that he once so effectively challenged,'
does little to hold lawyers' worst instincts" at bay. Which is not to
say that Horwitz is probably wrong about the bulk of social science
research today. That fact, however, does not mean that such was the
case in the Twenties and Thirties. Remember, neither rules nor any
other human practice has any necessary function or meaning, in-
cluding practices that we at present do not like. Past meaning is al-
62. See G. Edward White, Transforming History in the Post-Modern Era, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 1315 (1993); N. E. Duxbury, The Theory and History of American Law and Politics,
13 OxFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (1993).
63. A smaller "big tent" that includes Feminist Legal Studies and Critical Race The-
ory.
64. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American
Legal History, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 275 (1973).
65. My current favorite example of lawyers' worst instincts is the recovery of civic
republicanism in constitutional law. On this topic Alan Freeman & Betty Mensch, A Re-
publican Agenda for a Hobbesian America?, 41 U. FLA. L. REV. 581 (1989), do some neces-
sary balloon puncturing. -
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ways a matter of past understanding. In the relevant period empiri-
cal social science was, I believe, not only not harmful, but in fact
progressive.
Now what does this disquisition about the people in Horwitz's
book say about causation? Only this. If Horwitz were more careful of
social relations that help define groups of scholars when he writes,
he might both see that they help get beyond "the death of causation"
that he is so obviously uncomfortable with and similarly might avoid
seeing unlikes as likes, or at least be more aware of the kind of
strong argument that need be made if he really wants to argue for
the big tent of inter-war reform. He might even see the ways that
Critical Legal Studies was a distinctive note in its time. Being both
an internal critique and deeply opposed to reform in either its better
or worse guises, the movement could not be distanced as was Real-
ism-it's not doctrinal, so it's not really law-but only by declaring
that participation in the enterprise of reform was the sine qua non
for acceptance in the legal academy. Thus its members might have
understood, nay even expected, Paul Carrington's suggestion that
they voluntarily leave the law school world.66 But of course that is
another story, one that I started to tell in another place and besides
the wench is dead.
66. Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984).
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